Property disputes often arise when someone claims to be an heir of a deceased person who died many years earlier. The claimant asserts rights to real property based on alleged parentage. No probate estate was ever opened, so this isn’t technically a probate litigation case. No court has ever determined heirship. The property has changed hands multiple times over the decades.
The claimant files suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that he is an heir and owns an interest in the property. He asks the court to partition the property. The other parties dispute the claimed heirship. They argue the claimant must first establish his status as heir in probate court before pursuing property claims in district court.
This scenario raises fundamental questions about court jurisdiction. Does the district court have subject matter jurisdiction to determine heirship when no estate is under probate administration? Must an illegitimate child claiming inheritance rights first obtain a determination of paternity under the Texas Family Code or heirship under the Texas Probate Code before filing suit in district court? Can determination of heirship be a threshold issue in a property dispute, or must it be resolved through exclusive probate court procedures?
Jeter v. McGraw, 218 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) provides an opportunity to consider this issue.
Facts & Procedural History
Maine married Mary in 1931. The couple did not have any children together. In 1934, Maine and his mother Octovene purchased two tracts of land in Jasper County as co-tenants. Each owned a 50% undivided interest in the tracts. Maine and Mary remained married until Maine died intestate in 1947. As Maine’s surviving spouse, Mary then owned a community one-half interest in Maine’s 50% share.
In 1965, Octovene conveyed her 50% undivided interest in the tracts to Leonard and Gussie. Each received an undivided 25% interest. In 1981, attorney Bill McGraw prepared an affidavit of heirship setting out Leonard and Mary as the only heirs of Maine. The affidavit was filed in 1983. Mary subsequently conveyed all of her undivided interest to Bill McGraw.
Leonard asserted he is the biological son of Maine and Azzie Lee Adams. He claimed he was born outside of wedlock in 1935. He maintained he is entitled to one-half of his father Maine’s estate as a surviving child. This would make him a 50% undivided interest owner—25% conveyed from Octovene’s undivided 50% share and one-half of Maine’s 50% undivided share at his death—in the two tracts.
Leonard petitioned the district court to enter a declaratory judgment declaring him an heir of Maine and a 50% undivided interest owner of the two tracts. The McGraws answered and attached an affidavit of heirship signed by Maine’s uncle stating that Maine had never adopted Leonard, never executed an acknowledgment of paternity, and a probate court had never found Maine to be Leonard’s biological father.
The McGraws filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the heirship issue only. They asserted Leonard has never been adjudicated to be the child of Maine under Chapter 160 of the Texas Family Code and has not petitioned the probate court for a determination of right of inheritance under Section 42 of the Texas Probate Code. Leonard filed his motion for partial summary judgment requesting the court to determine that he is Maine’s son.
The trial court granted the McGraws’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied Leonard’s motion for partial summary judgment. With the trial court’s entry of the partition decree, the action became final and appealable. The court awarded the McGraws an undivided three-fourths interest in the property and Leonard an undivided one-fourth interest. Leonard appealed.
What Does Texas Law Say About Inheritance by Illegitimate Children?
Early Texas law allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from his father only if the father and mother married after the child’s birth, thereby legitimizing the child. This principle was later codified in Section 42 of the Texas Probate Code. Generally the statutes in force at the time of death govern the disposition of the decedent’s estate.
The United States Supreme Court held in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), that a state unreasonably restricts the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock when a statute totally disinherits said children from the paternal estate if the parents do not subsequently marry. In Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986), the Supreme Court expressly applied its holding in Trimble to Section 42 of the Texas Probate Code and held that Trimble would have retroactive application.
Because Maine never married Leonard’s biological mother, for a period of time Leonard was statutorily precluded from establishing his right to inheritance. In 1977, the legislature amended Section 42 to grant inheritance rights when the father voluntarily legitimized the child under Chapter 13 of the Texas Family Code. Leonard could not establish his right to inheritance under this provision because Maine never voluntarily legitimized Leonard.
In 1979 the legislature further amended Section 42 to allow a child to establish inheritance rights by court decree under Chapter 13 of the Family Code. Leonard could not establish he was Maine’s heir upon this amendment because as originally enacted, the Family Code provision barred the suit if the child initiating the suit was over one year old. At the time of the 1979 amendment, Leonard was forty years old. Over time, the permissible filing age increased to twenty years, but this increase was still of no avail to Leonard.
In response to Trimble, the Texas legislature subsequently amended Section 42 to allow a child to establish paternal inheritance in probate court even if not previously established under the Family Code. As an illegitimate putative heir, Leonard was finally allowed an opportunity to pursue a post-death paternity hearing to determine heirship.
What Court Has Jurisdiction Over Heirship Determinations?
The language of Section 42(b) coincides with Section 5 of the Texas Probate Code. Section 5(b) states that in those counties where there is no statutory probate court, county court at law or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all applications, petitions and motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in the county court unless the judge transfers the contested portion to district court. Jasper County has a constitutional county court but has no statutory probate court, county court at law or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court.
Subject matter jurisdiction exists by operation of law and cannot be conferred on a court by consent or waiver. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders a judgment void rather than merely voidable. Exclusive original jurisdiction to determine heirship is conferred upon the county court sitting in probate. The district court has no such original jurisdiction. In those counties where there is no statutory county court exercising probate jurisdiction, most probate matters must be filed in the constitutional county court, however the county judge may transfer contested matters to the district court.
Did the District Court Have Jurisdiction in This Case?
Leonard’s suit required a threshold determination of his heirship status prior to any adjudication of his entitlement to any of the real property purportedly originating in Maine’s estate. Such a determination was required because there was no record evidence that Leonard qualified as a “legitimate child of his father” for inheritance purposes under the applicable version of Section 42(b).
It was undisputed that Leonard’s mother and Maine were never married. Therefore no unrebutted presumption establishing a father-child relationship was shown. It was also undisputed that Leonard has never been legitimated by having been adjudicated to be the child of the father by court decree as provided for in the Texas Family Code or by adoption by Maine. There was no evidence that Maine ever executed an acknowledgment of paternity.
Because Leonard’s petition pleaded his entitlement to one-half of his father Maine’s estate as a surviving child, and because of the complete absence of record evidence that would permit Leonard to be considered a presumed child or an otherwise legitimate child of his father, the determination of Leonard’s heirship status became a threshold matter. Any resolution as to Leonard’s right to or interest in the tracts of land in question was secondary to his establishing a right to inherit from Maine.
The Supreme Court recognized in Reed v. Campbell that limited but permissible distinctions may be made on the basis of legitimacy when a statutory provision evidences a state’s interest in providing for the orderly and just distribution of a decedent’s property at death. The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedents’ estates may justify the imposition of special requirements upon an illegitimate child who asserts a right to inherit from her father. It justifies the enforcement of generally applicable limitations on the time and manner in which claims may be asserted.
Until heirship rights have been established, Leonard would appear to lack standing to file any action seeking to recover property formerly belonging to Maine on the basis of being Maine’s heir. Leonard filed this suit requesting a declaration of heirship and partition of the two tracts of land purported to be part of Maine’s intestate estate in the district court instead of Jasper County Court as required by the Probate Code.
Section 42(b) provides the exclusive means by which an illegitimate child may establish the right to inherit from his biological father. Under the facts and circumstances presented in the record, the district court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to determine Leonard’s heirship status.
What Is the Effect of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction?
Because the district court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, its orders granting the McGraws’ motion for partial summary judgment and denying Leonard’s motion for partial summary judgment and its partition decree were void. The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s partition decree and the orders on the motions for partial summary judgment and dismissed Leonard’s claims.
The dissenting opinion argued that this was a dispute over ownership and partition of land over which the district court has subject matter jurisdiction. The dissent noted that no estate was under administration by a probate court. The dissent contended that the district court may determine heirship in the exercise of its authority to decide the ownership interests in the land and partition the property.
The dissent pointed to cases holding that in a non-probate case such as a trespass to try title suit, a district court may determine the heirs of a decedent and do all things necessary and proper to ascertain the lawful owners of the property. The dissent noted that when a court originally obtains power and jurisdiction over all the parties and the subject matter, it may determine the heirs of a decedent and do all things necessary and proper to ascertain the lawful owners and effect partition.
The dissent also noted that Bill McGraw had testified at his deposition that he did not dispute that Leonard was the son of Maine. McGraw, an attorney, had prepared the affidavit of heirship stating Leonard was the son of Maine. The dissent questioned whether Leonard could have attacked the judgment in another court proceeding at any time if it was truly void.
How the 2017 Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act Affects Similar Cases
In 2017, the Texas Legislature enacted the Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act as Chapter 23A of the Texas Property Code, effective September 1, 2017. This new statute addresses partition actions involving property that has passed down through families—precisely the type of situation presented in Jeter. The statute creates special procedures that apply when property qualifies as “heirs’ property.”
Under Section 23A.002(5), “heirs’ property” means real property held in tenancy in common that satisfies three requirements. First, there must be no agreement binding all cotenants that governs partition of the property. Second, one or more cotenants must have acquired title from a relative. Third, either 20 percent or more of the interests are held by cotenants who are relatives, or 20 percent or more of the interests are held by an individual who acquired title from a relative, or 20 percent or more of the cotenants are relatives.
Section 23A.003(a) requires that in any action to partition real property under Chapter 23, the court must determine whether the property is heirs’ property. If the court determines that the property is heirs’ property, the property must be partitioned under Chapter 23A unless all cotenants otherwise agree in a record. This statute supplements Chapter 23 and supersedes provisions of Chapter 23 and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing partition that are inconsistent with the new statute.
The Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act provides important protections for cotenants in family property. Section 23A.007 gives cotenants who did not request partition by sale the right to buy out the interests of cotenants who requested such a sale. Section 23A.009 requires courts to consider specific factors when determining whether partition in kind would result in substantial prejudice to the cotenants as a group. These factors include sentimental attachment to the property, any attachment arising because the property has ancestral or unique value, and the collective duration of ownership by family members.
However, the 2017 statute does not appear to directly address the jurisdictional issue that was determinative in Jeter. Chapter 23A does not modify the requirement that heirship status be established through the procedures set forth in the Texas Estates Code when an illegitimate child seeks to establish inheritance rights. The statute assumes that parties claiming interests as heirs have already established their status as heirs through appropriate legal procedures.
Section 23A.003(a) states that courts determining partition actions “shall determine whether the property is heirs’ property” under the statutory definition. This determination involves assessing whether cotenants are “relatives” and whether they acquired title from relatives. But determining whether someone is a relative for purposes of Chapter 23A is different from adjudicating heirship status for purposes of establishing inheritance rights under the Texas Estates Code.
The practical effect of the 2017 statute is that once heirship has been properly established through probate court proceedings or other statutory procedures, cotenants in family property receive enhanced protections in partition actions. The statute recognizes the unique nature of property that has been passed down through families and provides mechanisms to keep such property within the family when possible. Courts must now follow specific procedures for valuation, provide buyout opportunities, and carefully consider whether partition in kind is feasible before ordering a sale.
For cases like Jeter, where the threshold issue is whether someone has established their status as an heir in the first place, the 2017 statute does not change the fundamental jurisdictional requirement. A person claiming to be an heir must still comply with the Texas Estates Code provisions for establishing heirship. Once heirship is established, however, the Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act provides additional protections and procedures that did not exist when Jeter was decided. The statute represents a legislative recognition that family property deserves special treatment in partition actions, but it does not eliminate the requirement that heirship be properly adjudicated before property rights can be determined.
The Takeaway
A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine heirship status when an illegitimate child seeks to establish inheritance rights from a deceased putative father under circumstances requiring compliance with the Texas Probate Code’s exclusive procedural requirements. When a person claiming to be an heir has never been adjudicated to be the child of the father by court decree under the Texas Family Code and has not petitioned the probate court for a determination of right of inheritance under Section 42 of the Texas Probate Code, the determination of heirship status becomes a threshold matter that must be resolved in probate court. The Jeter case demonstrates that exclusive original jurisdiction to determine heirship is conferred upon the county court sitting in probate in counties without statutory probate courts. A party lacks standing to file an action seeking to recover property on the basis of being an heir until heirship rights have been established through the proper statutory procedures. Because subject matter jurisdiction exists by operation of law and cannot be conferred by consent or waiver, judgments rendered by district courts without subject matter jurisdiction over heirship determinations are void rather than merely voidable. While the 2017 Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act provides important protections for family members involved in partition actions, it does not change the requirement that heirship must first be properly established through the procedures set forth in the Texas Estates Code before property rights based on heir status can be adjudicated.
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